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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
ALITO, Circuit Judge: 
 
Joseph Moses appeals his criminal convictions for 
willfully failing to file corporate tax returns, willfully filing 
false personal tax returns, and conspiring to defraud the 
United States by obstructing the lawful functions of the 
Internal Revenue Service (IRS). Moses assigns as error the 
district court's denial of his post-trial motion for a 
judgment of acquittal, as well as its admission of certain 




While Director of the Allegheny County Maintenance 
Department, Joseph Moses accepted kickbacks from 
Edmond Gaudelli, a commercial vendor who did business 
with the County. These kickbacks were routed through 
Catherine Jean Ronschke, an employee of the Department, 
to conceal the source and nature of the payments. With the 
aid of the kickbacks from Gaudelli, Moses was able to meet 
the financial obligations of Sadies Place, Inc., a private 
corporation he had formed in 1985. Between 1985 and 
1993, Moses failed to file several corporate tax returns for 
Sadies Place and failed to report his kickback income on 
his personal tax returns. Meanwhile, Gaudelli deducted the 
kickbacks as business expenses on his returns. When 
called before a grand jury in May 1994 to discuss these 
matters, Gaudelli and Ronschke both made false 
statements regarding their financial dealings with Moses. 
 
Based on these and other events, Moses, Gaudelli and 
Ronschke were indicted for conspiring to defraud the 
United States by obstructing the lawful functions of the 
IRS. See 18 U.S.C. S 371. In addition, Moses was indicted 
for willfully filing a false personal income tax return, in 
violation of 26 U.S.C. S 7206(1), and willfully failing to file 
four corporate tax returns for Sadies Place, in violation of 
26 U.S.C. S 7203. 
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At trial, Moses objected to the admission of several 
hearsay statements made by Gaudelli and Ronschke. The 
district court overruled these objections, concluding that 
some of the statements were admissible because they were 
against the declarant's penal interest, see Fed. Rule Evid. 
804(b)(3), and others were admissible because they were 
made in furtherance of the conspiracy. See Fed. Rule Evid. 
801(d)(2)(E). After the jury convicted Moses on all counts, 
he moved for a judgment of acquittal on the ground that 
there was insufficient evidence to convict him of willfully 
failing to file the Sadies Place returns. The district court 






Moses's primary contention on appeal is that the district 
court erroneously admitted out-of-court statements made 
by Edmond Gaudelli. Gaudelli's statements, which 
implicated Moses in the kickback scheme, were presented 
through the testimony of Michael Tutro, a government 
witness who had been a friend and colleague of Gaudelli's. 
According to Tutro, Gaudelli said on several occasions that 
he was "tak[ing] care" of Moses "moneywise." App. 434-37. 
Tutro further testified that Gaudelli would tell him where 
he was meeting with Moses to make these payments. The 
district court concluded that Gaudelli's statements were 
admissible under Federal Rule of Evidence 804(b)(3) as 
statements against penal interest, and further held that 
admission of Gaudelli's statements would not violate the 
Confrontation Clause. Moses challenges both of these 
rulings on appeal. 
 
A hearsay statement made by an unavailable declarant 
can be admitted pursuant to Rule 804(b)(3) if, at the time 
of its making, "it so far tended to subject the declarant to 
civil or criminal liability . . . that a reasonable person in the 
declarant's position would not have made the statement 
unless believing it to be true." Since there is no dispute 
over Gaudelli's unavailability, the only question under Rule 
804(b)(3) is whether the admitted statements were 
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sufficiently against Gaudelli's interest so as to be deemed 
reliable. This determination must be made "by viewing [the 
statement] in context" and "in light of all the surrounding 
circumstances." Williamson v. United States, 512 U.S. 594, 
603-604 (1994). 
 
Moses contends that Gaudelli's statements are not 
admissible under Rule 804(b)(3) because "statements 
implicating another person in misconduct are not against 
the interest of the declarant." Reply Br. at 1. While this 
proposition holds true in many cases, it is not a per se rule. 
As the Supreme Court explained in Williamson: 
 
       There are many circumstances in which Rule 804(b)(3) 
       does allow the admission of statements that inculpate 
       a criminal defendant. Even the confessions of arrested 
       accomplices may be admissible if they are truly self- 
       inculpatory, rather than merely attempts to shift blame 
       or curry favor. 
 
512 U.S. at 603. 
 
Under Williamson, the proper approach in cases involving 
out-of-court statements implicating other people is to 
examine the circumstances in which the statements are 
made in order to determine whether they are self- 
inculpatory or self-serving. In Williamson, where the 
declarant implicated another person while in police custody 
and after already having confessed to the crime, the Court 
concluded that the naming of the defendant did little to 
further implicate the declarant and may have been an effort 
to secure a lesser punishment through cooperation. See 
512 U.S. at 604 (opinion of O'Connor, J., in which Scalia, 
J. joined); id. at 607-08 (opinion of Ginsburg, J., in which 
Blackmun, Stevens, and Souter, J.J., joined). See also 
United States v. Boyce, 849 F.2d 833, 836 (3d Cir. 1988) 
(statement given in custody not reliable because 
circumstances indicated that it may have been "motivated 
by a desire to curry favor"). In the instant case, by contrast, 
Gaudelli made his statements to a friend during lunch 
conversations that took place long before Gaudelli was 
arrested. Under these circumstances, there is no reason to 
believe that Gaudelli was trying to avoid criminal 
consequences by passing blame to Moses.1  Moreover, by 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. This conclusion is supported by the Notes of Advisory Committee to 
Rule 804(b)(3): 
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naming Moses, as well as the place where he was meeting 
Moses to make payments, Gaudelli provided self- 
inculpatory information that might have enabled the 
authorities to better investigate his wrongdoing. See 
Williamson, 512 U.S. at 603 (explaining that a declarant's 
statement as to where he hid a gun would be self- 
inculpatory "if it is likely to help the police find the murder 
weapon"). Given the context and content of Gaudelli's 
statements to Tutro, we agree with the district court that 
they were sufficiently self-inculpatory so as to satisfy the 
requirements of Rule 804(b)(3). 
 
Moses's Confrontation Clause argument presents a more 
complicated question. The Supreme Court has held that an 
out-of-court statement may be barred by the Confrontation 
Clause even if it fits a hearsay exception. Idaho v. Wright, 
497 U.S. 805, 814 (1990). The Wright Court explained that, 
to be admissible under the Sixth Amendment, a hearsay 
statement must either fall within a "firmly rooted" hearsay 
exception or be "supported by a showing of particularized 
guarantees of trustworthiness." Id. at 816-17 (citation 
omitted). While the district court concluded that the 
"statement against penal interest" exception is firmly 
rooted, we decline to address that issue because we believe 
that a hearsay statement that meets the requirements of 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
       [A] statement admitting guilt and implicating another person, while 
       made in custody, may well be motivated by a desire to curry favor 
       with the authorities and hence fail to qualify as against interest. 
. . . 
       On the other hand, the same words spoken under different 
       circumstances, e.g., to an acquaintance, would have no difficulty 
in 
       qualifying. 
 
28 U.S.C.A. Rule 804, p. 449 (1984). While the Supreme Court in 
Williamson concluded that the Advisory Notes are"not particularly clear" 
as to the admissibility of non-self-inculpatory statements that are 
collateral to self-inculpatory statements, see  512 U.S. at 601-02, the 
Notes are perfectly clear as to the difference between custodial and non- 
custodial circumstances for purposes of determining whether a 
statement is self-inculpatory in the first place. 
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Rule 804(b)(3) by definition possesses "particularized 
guarantees of trustworthiness."2 
 
Rule 804(b)(3) does not allow the admission of all 
statements that could be interpreted as against the 
declarant's penal interest. Rather, the rule permits the use 
of a statement only if it "so far tended" to subject the 
declarant to criminal liability "that a reasonable man in his 
position would not have made the statement unless he 
believed it to be true." Fed. Rule Evid. 804(b)(3). As 
discussed above, this language requires courts to examine 
"all the surrounding circumstances" in order to determine 
whether a statement is "truly self-inculpatory." Williamson, 
512 U.S. at 603-04. This examination parallels the inquiry 
required under the Confrontation Clause. See Wright, 497 
U.S. at 820 (courts must examine "the totality of 
circumstances that surround the making of the statement" 
to determine whether the declarant's statement is 
"particularly worthy of belief ").3 Accordingly, we conclude 
that a statement that meets the requirements of Rule 
804(b)(3) also meets the requirements imposed by the 
Confrontation Clause. Accord Williamson, 512 U.S. at 605 
(opinion of O'Connor, J., in which Scalia, J., joined). Since 
Gaudelli's statements were made under circumstances that 
render them particularly worthy of belief for purposes of 
Rule 804(b)(3), we affirm the district court's ruling that the 
statements are not barred by the Confrontation Clause. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. We note that there is disagreement among the circuits as to whether 
the "statement against penal interest" exception is firmly rooted. 
Compare United States v. Flores, 985 F.2d 770, 775-776 (5th Cir. 1993) 
(not firmly rooted) with United States v. Saccoccia, 58 F.3d 754, 779 (1st 
Cir. 1995) (firmly rooted); United States v. York, 933 F.2d 1343, 1363 
(7th Cir. 1991) (same); United States v. Seeley, 892 F.2d 1, 2 (1st Cir. 
1989) ("[T]he exception for declarations against penal interest would 
seem to be `firmly rooted.' "). 
 
3. In examining the totality of the circumstances, courts cannot rely on 
corroborating evidence to conclude that a hearsay statement is 
trustworthy for purposes of the Confrontation Clause. Wright, 497 U.S. 
at 822-823. Moses correctly points out that the district court erred by 
relying on corroborating evidence in the instant case. See App. at 425. 
This error was harmless, however, given that the circumstances 
surrounding the making of Gaudelli's statements are alone sufficient to 
render them trustworthy. 
 




Moses's next contention is that the district court 
erroneously admitted the grand jury testimony of Jean 
Ronschke and Edmond Gaudelli as non-hearsay under 
Federal Rule of Evidence 801(d)(2)(E).4  That rule provides: 
 
       A statement is not hearsay if . . . [t]he statement is 
       offered against a party and is . . . a statement by a 
       coconspirator of a party during the course and in 
       furtherance of the conspiracy. 
 
Moses argues that the statements made by Ronschke and 
Gaudelli are not admissible under Rule 801(d)(2)(E) because 
they were made after the object of the charged conspiracy 
had been accomplished and, thus, were not statements in 
furtherance of the conspiracy. In making this argument, 
Moses relies on the Supreme Court's instruction that "after 
the central criminal purposes of a conspiracy have been 
attained, a subsidiary conspiracy to conceal may not be 
implied from circumstantial evidence showing merely that 
the conspiracy was kept a secret and that the conspirators 
took care to cover up their crime in order to escape 
detention and punishment." Grunewald v. United States, 
353 U.S. 391, 401-02 (1957). Moses contends that the 
central purpose of the instant conspiracy was to "avoid 
declaring . . . additional income for the years 1985-88." 
Appellant's Br. at 31. Since Gaudelli and Ronschke did not 
provide their testimony until 1994, Moses argues that, 
under Grunewald, it was improper to admit their 
statements as being in furtherance of the original 
conspiracy. However, contrary to Moses's characterization, 
the conspiracy charged in the indictment was not limited to 
the years 1985-1988. Rather, the indictment explicitly 
charged a conspiracy to defraud the IRS lasting until June 
30, 1994, App. at 26, and it alleged that the conspirators 
engaged in more than 50 overt acts in furtherance of the 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
4. A review of the district court's order reveals that much of the grand 
jury testimony was admitted because it did not meet the definition of 
hearsay. See Supp. App. at 1-5 (holding that"some of the testimony is 
not being offered to prove the truth of the matter asserted, and therefore 
is not hearsay"). Moses has not appealed this portion of the district 
court's ruling. 
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conspiracy between 1989 and 1994. App. at 37-43. Thus, 
this case is wholly distinguishable from Grunewald, where 
the main objective of the conspiracy was to obtain "no 
prosecution" letters from the IRS in 1948 and 1949, but the 
government sought to imply a subsidiary conspiracy to 
conceal in the 1950s. 353 U.S. at 398. 
 
We agree with the district court that this case is 
controlled by Forman v. United States, 361 U.S. 416 (1960), 
overruled in part on other grounds by Burks v. United 
States, 437 U.S. 1, 18 (1978). In Forman, the defendant 
was charged with conspiracy to evade income taxes that 
were owed for the period of 1942-45. Id. at 417-19. 
Although the last false income tax form was filed in 1946, 
the government contended that the conspiracy embraced 
"subsequent efforts . . . to evade those taxes." Id. at 420. 
The Supreme Court agreed, noting that "the indictment 
specifically alleged that the conspiracy extended from 1942 
to 1953" and charged overt acts "committed as late as 
1953." Id. at 423. The Court continued: 
 
       The correct theory, we believe, was indicated by the 
       indictment, i.e., that the conspiracy was a continuing 
       one extending from 1942 to 1953 and its principal 
       object was to evade the taxes of [the defendant] and his 
       wife for 1942-1945, inclusive, by concealing their 
       `holdout' income. This object was not attained when the 
       tax returns for 1945 concealing the `holdout' income 
       were filed. . . . The concealment of the`holdout' income 
       must continue if the evasion is to succeed. It must 
       continue until the action is barred and the evasion 
       permanently effected. 
 
Id. at 423-24. Like the indictment in Forman, the 
indictment in this case specifically alleges a continuing 
conspiracy to evade taxes that included overt acts of 
concealment after the taxes were due. In order for this 
conspiracy to succeed, Moses and his co-conspirators had 
to conceal his failure to pay taxes until any action was 
barred and the evasion was "permanently effected." Id. at 
424. Since this object had not yet been achieved when 
Gaudelli and Ronschke testified before the grand-jury,5 the 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
5. We take as accurate the government's statement that "Moses' liability 
for taxes owed on unreported kickbacks . . . remained open" at the time 
of the grand jury testimony. Appellee's Br. at 41. Moses did not dispute 
this factual assertion. 
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district court was entitled to conclude that Gaudelli and 
Ronschke made their statements in furtherance of the 
conspiracy. Accordingly, we affirm the order of the district 
court admitting the statements of Edmond Gaudelli and 




Moses's final contention is that the government presented 
insufficient evidence to demonstrate that he willfully failed 
to file tax returns for the Sadies Place business in violation 
of 26 U.S.C. S 7203. To prove willfulness in a criminal tax 
case, the government must show "that the law imposed a 
duty on the defendant, that the defendant knew of this 
duty, and that he voluntarily and intentionally violated that 
duty." Cheek v. United States, 498 U.S. 192, 201 (1991). 
Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the 
government, we agree with the district court that a 
reasonable juror could have concluded that Moses acted 
willfully. 
 
The evidence presented at trial revealed that Moses was 
the sole owner of the Sadies Place business and exercised 
complete control over the business. The evidence also 
revealed that Moses was aware of his obligation tofile tax 
forms for Sadies Place as he hired an accountant, Joseph 
Jacobs, to complete tax forms for Sadies Place and submit 
them to a lending institution. Nevertheless, Moses never 
signed any of the Sadies Place tax forms during the years 
in question and did not cause the forms to be submitted to 
the IRS until after he was indicted. Moreover, the 
government demonstrated that Moses had a motive to 
withhold the Sadies Place tax forms from the IRS. At the 
time the Sadies Place forms were due, Moses was trying to 
settle a previous liability to the IRS on favorable terms. This 
effort might have been jeopardized, however, had the IRS 
learned from the Sadies Place returns that Moses possessed 
additional assets. Under these circumstances, a reasonable 
juror could conclude that Moses knew of his duty tofile the 
Sadies Place returns and intentionally refrained from doing 
so. 
 
Notwithstanding this strong circumstantial evidence, 
Moses contends that his conviction was unreasonable in 
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light of Jacobs' testimony. Jacobs, who appeared as a 
government witness, testified that Moses insisted the 
Sadies Place returns be filed. After reviewing the record, we 
agree with the district court that "the jury was not obligated 
to accept Jacobs' testimony . . . and in light of Jacobs' 
demeanor as a witness and his close association with 
Moses personally, professionally and in the criminal 
scheme, obviously had abundant reason to disregard it." 
Supp. App. at 25. Accordingly, we affirm the district court's 
denial of Moses's motion for acquittal on Counts Five, Six, 
Seven and Eight of the indictment. 
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